First, this is no surprise. The current SEC has signaled its overall intention to eliminate certain currently required levels of public company disclosure. Friday the SEC proposed to apply its approach to disclosure required by public companies relating to executive compensation.
Major proposals: Only CEOs and CFOs need report; the next three highest paid executives on longer need be disclosed. CEO perks need be disclosed only if over $150,000 (today it is $10,000 threshold). Today comp that is salary and comp that is bonus or perks or equity are lumped in a single chart; in the future the elements of compensation would be separated. Present requirement that pay vs performance disclosure be tied to net income would be replaced by disclosure keyed to reflect total shareholder return. The requirement that executive compensation be compared to median employee compensation would be altered so that the comparison would not include part-time or seasonal employees. (There are other less interesting elements of the SEC proposal, which are omitted here given there is enough to discuss in analyzing the high points.)
The SEC Chair has said the changes are designed to “streamline and clarify” the data. One widely known investor advocate has been quoted as stating that the changes are designed to “hide the facts and keep investors in the dark.” Each reaction is so expectable that the same characterizations can be applied automatically to every new proposal of the current Commission.
Another Republican Commissioner stated that the new rules permit companies “greater flexibility in structuring their compensation programs.” I am embarrassed to think that this Commissioner thinks this a rational comment: Companies can structure their programs any way they wish, as always; it is the reporting that is changed and in a manner that provides less information. A cynic might claim that these changes permit greater obscurity of greater compensation.
How should we think about these SEC proposals, which are expressly identified by SEC Chair Atkins as reflecting “my regulatory philosophy of prescribing the minimum effective dose of regulation.” It is easy to dismiss the SEC contention that all these proposals clarify; most change or reduce the quantum of actual disclosure so clarity is not the issue. Separating the reporting of the different elements of CEO compensation can only confuse at best. Eliminating disclosure of the next three high earners simply reduces information and also makes it easier to park relatives or friends in cushy positions where investors might be of the view that they are overpaid.
Two proposed changes did give me greater pause in my reaction.
A fifteen-fold increase in the trigger amount of bonuses and perks that need be disclosed, reset at $150,000 a year, at first blush feels like the abandonment of reason. However, given the deterioration of the dollar and the new economics of the world, as a practical matter this reduction of disclosure probably feels worse than it is. On the other hand, what is the harm of leaving it in place–if 150K these days is not a lot of money for a CEO, then disclosing it should not be a controversial thing.
Finally, the proposal tinkers with the required comparison of executive comp with median employee compensation. This requirement, arises in what feels like an issue that was created a million years ago in the Dodd-Frank Act (actually enacted over sixteen years ago when corporate and personal earning levels throughout society were at vastly different levels from today). I would have expected the SEC to seek elimination of this metric; it is likely something of an embarrassment for some CEOs and a vestige of a dated view of on-the-ground economics in a capitalist society. Today’s CEOs for good or ill are typically very well compensated on any metrics. My liberal friends may accuse me of selling out to the new and annoying corporate elite, but I do not see why the executives-to-employee pay ratio gives me any data an investor should care about. Vast divergence of wealth is an issue for government as an overall matter–is it okay or not that the average worker earns what they earn and that the average CEO of a US public company earns what they earn; is it wise to tinker with that issue given our socio-economic system; is the best point of analysis a discussion of a more socialist society (a model that is just not American); in any event is it not clear that this issue is not appropriate for an SEC disclosure document?
‘Nuf said. I have purposely drifted far afield, where I do not belong….