Today the SEC has formally proposed two significant changes to the rights afforded by Federal law to stockholders in publicly traded companies.
The SEC seeks to rescind Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which permits shareholders to propose matters to be voted upon at shareholder meetings.
The SEC also proposes to eliminate the requirement that companies deliver an annual report to shareholders.
Today commences a 60 day public comment period. It is safe to say that investor rights groups will object; who knows whether rank-and-file individual shareholders also will indivdually write to the SEC to object to the shrinkage of these rights.
As to the elimination of annual reports, I suspect many companies will nonetheless continue the practice in order to inform shareholders and the general marketplace; although any given elimination may prove of negative impact on shareholders and investors, which is regrettable.
The reasons propounded by the Commission for eliminating shareholder proposals are as follows, quoting the SEC Press Release: “Many of the justifications for adopting the rule either have not been substantiated in practice or are less compelling today, and the rule has unintended consequences, including the implication of federal preemption that may have discouraged states from developing their own laws governing shareholder proposals.”
The Republican majority on the Commission has been consistent in actions cementing control of public corporations in management. There is no doubt but that the Commission under prior Democratic control instituted many shareholder protections, and one can of course be of the substantive view that management needs to be protected in its judgments and not second-guessed. But no doubt many shareholder proposals have been driven by liberal social agendas; the question is whether, if a majority of shareholders votes to adopt a given policy, then should not that policy (however “liberal”) be adopted?
One argument in favor of the SEC’s new effort to eliminate shareholder proposals is quite logical: the shareholders are indeed presently in ultimate charge, since they voted to elect the directors so, let’s let them direct. I must note, granting this argument’s logic, that nonetheless I find the stated reasons for the SEC elimination of shareholder proposals to be hollow.
First, in fact there are present legal standards controlling what can be proposed, thus giving management substantial control already. Second, any such proposals are just proposals–the burden on a company under the Rule is to put them up for vote, which may be annoying to management but surely not onerous to do.
Third, let us parse the words of the Press Release:
- The SEC says that justifications for the Rule have not been substantiated today: what are the metrics to measure the level of justification of the present Rule calling for permitting shareholder proposals? Should not the SEC be charged with making the process fair for a hearing of shareholder proposals which have been made by shareholders under existing law; has a study in fact been made of the Rule’s adequacy in justification of its intent — the Rule was designed to permit certain proposals to be put to a vote and it in fact does that–if a proposal is voted down then it is voted down, but that is the process, envisioned by the Rule: to propose and vote.
- The justifications for the Rule are less compelling today: says who on what basis? Who is to say that there is less need for shareholder proposals today as opposed to the need upon the date of adoption of the Rule? Who is to say that present society is calmer, more aligned, less concerned with the course of action of corporations today as opposed to ANY prior time?
- The Rule has unintended consequences: What does that mean? The Rule intended that shareholders propose corporate policy in certain defined areas. That is what happens. Who did not intend that clear result? Perhaps management may not like it, but we are not talking about what management intended, but rather what the Rule intended.
- The Rule implies federal preemption that may have discouraged states from developing their own laws governing shareholder proposals: is there evidence this “maybe” has happened? If this is a concern, the SEC could amend the Rule to provide that States also have the power to legislate in this regard, without need to void the Federal Rule for States choosing not to legislate.
Bottom line: the SEC; has a job to do and our governance system says that the Federal administration in power can control the SEC Board composition and thus implicitly reflect the philosophy of that duly elected administration. That is what our system of government is all about, and if I disagree on a given policy but am outvoted then that’s that. But I am of the view that the stated arguments in the SEC press release on eliminating shareholder proposals are of no substance, just words. The majority of the Commission seemingly is pro-management without regard for shareholder views. The Commission should be better than that; they work for the owners of American enterprise, not for the CEOs or the boards of directors. There is no evidence adduced that the net effect of shareholder proposals that are adopted under the Rule have been harmful to our society.